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Families and Religions: An Anthropological Typology 
James V. Spickard1 
 
Published in The Religion and Family Connection: Social Science 
Perspectives, ed. Darwin L. Thomas (Provo, UT: Religious Studies 
Center, Brigham Young University, 1988), 324–42. 
Abstract 
This chapter outlines a typology of relationships between reli-
gious ideas and family structures, based on the work of anthro-
pologist Mary Douglas.  It illustrates that typology with 
descriptions of the religious and family differences between 
Nepalese Hindus, Nepalese Buddhists, and Coast Miwok Indi-
ans.  It ends with some suggestions about how the typology 
might be used to analyze North American religions. 
Introduction 
Religious apologists frequently speak of the important relationship 
between religion and family life. “The family that prays together stays 
together” is an oft-cited—though occasionally ridiculed—cultural 
aphorism. The converse is often conceived to be true as well: strong 
family structure is supposed to provide an opening to the spiritual life. 
Despite the historic importance of monastic religion, most Americans 
believe that religion and traditional family life go together, and are 
mutually reinforcing. 
To cite only a few examples of this cultural assumption: 
My local newspaper’s “Church Notes” for the week in which I am 
writing shows that four of the ten or so published sermon topics deal 
with family issues. This same newspaper quotes state politicians op-
posing employment protection for gays because “homosexuality goes 
against both God and family.”2  
Howard Ruff, the well-known investment counselor, draws an ex-
plicit connection between his Mormon convictions and the centrality 
                                               
1 This essay was written for the Twelfth Annual Family and Demographic 
Research Institute Conference on Religion and the Family, held at Brigham 
Young University in February, 1984.1 am indebted to John Sorenson of the 
Anthropology Department at Brigham Young for comments and criticism. 
2 Watsonville Register-Pajaronian, February 11 and 16, 1984. 
of “family values” to his life (Ruff 1983). His financial advice is de-
signed to give the middle class the means to support both family and 
the church of their choice. 
On a more academic note, a chapter entitled something like “The 
Family in Religious Context” is—or at least used to be—an obligatory 
part of any introductory text in sociology of religion.3  
Indeed, the very existence of a conference on “Religion and the 
Family” implies a connection between religion and family more signif-
icant than that between, say, “the Family and Greed” or “Religion and 
Cheap Sex.” Something universal is suggested to us by the first juxta-
position that is lacking in the others. 
These are clearly impressionistic data—but that is just the point. 
The supposed connection between religions and families is an ideolog-
ical artifact, something that we expect because of our cultural heritage. 
The significant question, then, is “Does such a connection actually ex-
ist?” 
This question may be posed in a more sophisticated manner. 
“How,” we may ask, “are religions and families related in each of sev-
eral cultural milieux?” If, in fact, our cultural ideology proposes that 
religions and families are mutually supporting (and if in certain seg-
ments of our society they are supporting) we ought to expect that in 
other cultures and societies different types of relationships will be cul-
turally expected, and indeed will apply. 
We also ought to expect that religion and family will be even more 
reinforcing for some groups than they are alleged to be among us. For 
others they will be supportive, but in a completely different mode. And 
for still others, religion and family will have nothing to do with one 
another. Such is the cultural variation that anthropology teaches us to 
anticipate. 
An Anthropological Typology 
In order to approach this issue we must make use of a typology. 
We must group together various societies so that their different ways 
of relating religion and family become apparent. But no purely ad hoc 
grouping will do, for we hope that the differences discovered here will 
correlate with cultural differences on other levels. We seek real divid-
                                               
3 For example, Benson (1960), Hoult (1958). 
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2 
ing lines that separate different cultures, and which may prove to illu-
minate cultural differences within our society as well. 
British anthropologist Mary Douglas has spent the last fifteen or so 
years constructing such a typology—one which relates many elements 
of culture, including religious belief, to social structure. (Her theory is 
found in various forms in Douglas, 1970,1973a, 1973b, 1978,1982; 
and Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982. Douglas, 1978 is the key text.) 
She calls her system “Grid/Group Analysis” (the name admittedly 
lacks style). She presents it as a means of sorting various societies and, 
at the same time, ordering their belief systems. Society and cosmolo-
gy, she says, vary together. Social forms come packaged with beliefs 
in such a way that “most values and beliefs can be analysed as part of 
society instead of as a separate cultural sphere” (Douglas, 1982: 7). 
Religion and social structure—for our interests, religion and the kin-
system—can be analyzed in one motion. Douglas claims to be able to 
predict the kind of relation between these two elements from the posi-
tion a given society takes in her scheme. 
Douglas presents several forms of her typology, about which I 
have written elsewhere (Spickard, 1984). In the typology’s most de-
fensible form she distinguishes between three basic kinds of social or-
ganization. These she labels “ascribed hierarchy,” “individualism,” 
and “factionalism/sectarianism.” (Douglas, 1982: 4.) 
Ascribed hierarchy portrays a social unit in which the group is ap-
parently the focus of all activity, and in which hierarchical roles and 
prescriptive rules govern almost all behavior. The individual is en-
meshed in a net of expectations that govern a great part of his or her 
behavior. Examples of this social type are the Hindu caste system ( in 
its more rigid manifestations) and medieval monastic Catholicism. 
Individualism portrays just the opposite4 kind of social system: one 
in which individuals and individual activity are the focus of social life, 
and in which there are few or no specified roles and rules to which the 
individual must conform. Here the basis of social life is the individual-
centered network rather than the group. Within this social type, indi-
                                               
4 Declaring that “individualism” and “ascribed hierarchy” are opposites be-
trays a peculiarly Western cultural bias of which Douglas seems to be una-
ware. This is the source of one of my criticisms of her theory (Spickard, 
1984: chapter 15), but it does not vitiate my use of her typology for the quite 
limited purposes of this essay. 
viduals choose their own companions, negotiate the terms of their in-
teractions with one another, and compete for the possession of what-
ever their society values. 
“Factional/sectarian” societies are somewhat different, possessing 
both an extreme attachment to group life and a lack of the internal role 
differentiation that might make that life go smoothly. Individuals lack 
guidelines on how to regulate their behavior—a situation which Doug-
las claims produces conflict and competition among them. But compe-
tition is neither allowed overt expression (as among the individualists), 
nor is it forced into socially sanctioned channels (as among the hier-
archists). The result is covert conflict, which periodically erupts into 
social strife. Douglas’s examples include central African witchcraft 
movements (she did her fieldwork among the Lele of Zaire) and, inter-
estingly, academic departments. She remarks that the latter, with their 
developed consciousness of the boundaries between their own and 
other academic disciplines, and with their putative (but not actual) in-
ternal egalitarianism, are prime social grounds for covert infighting 
and periodic “witchhunts.” (1973a: 168–69.) 
Each of these social types, Douglas argues, exhibits a distinctive 
cosmology—ofttimes religious—that proves functional to the conduct 
of its life. Different types of society typically encounter differing or-
ganizational problems, which their cosmologies may mediate or even 
solve. (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982.) 
Hierarchical organizations, for example, suffer from the difficulty 
of getting many people with differing skills and interests to agree on 
any undertaking, even on living together for great lengths of time. To 
counter this, the hierarchist’s cosmology will emphasize the group 
above the individual and will promote multiple goals, thus satisfying 
everyone enough to keep the group going. Nepalese Hindu polytheism, 
as we shall soon see, conforms to this model. 
Individualism, on the other hand, suffers from an inability to see 
long-term projects through to completion, and from an inability to 
weigh the long-term or cumulative effects of individual actions. This is 
counteracted—though at the same time sustained—by a cosmology 
that sees universal, impersonal forces regulating the effects of individ-
ual decisions for the benefit of all. The “invisible hand” of free-market 
economists is the most famous example, though the extent to which 
this hand actually helps solve the individualist’s organizational prob-
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lems is very much in doubt. Nepalese Buddhist conceptions of merit, 
which I shall examine later, do a better job. 
The way beliefs arise from and affect “factional/sectarian” socie-
ties is more complicated, and is best considered in conjunction with 
my example of the Coast Miwok, below. 
I shall first illustrate Douglas’s typology by describing the rela-
tionship between religion and family in three non-Western societies.5 
Then I shall use it to examine some of the recent religious develop-
ments in North America. For both endeavors we shall have to free our-
selves from any too-limited definition of religion, and indeed from any 
too-American definition of family. Instead, we must frame our analy-
sis in terms of wider kin relations and the general shape of relations 
with the spiritual world. 
Nepalese Hindus 
Nepalese Hindu culture, as studied by Haimendorf (1979), Hitch-
cock (1966) and others, generally corresponds to Douglas’s hierar-
chical model. 
Castes are a dominant attribute of Nepalese Hindu life. Though in 
India castes include a multitude of people not directly related to one 
another, in a Nepal village caste is a more kin-like institution. A given 
caste (such as the Chetri or Magars) regards itself as having entered 
the area at a particular point in history from a given location, and is 
made up of a specified number of lineages, each with a corporate or-
ganization. Caste, lineage, and family form a hierarchical nesting of 
family or family-like ties. 
Hierarchy also dominates intercaste relations, though the prohibi-
tions against intercaste contact are less among Nepalese than they are 
among Hindus of India (Hitchcock, 1966: chapter 7). Various types of 
Brahmans rank above other “twice-born” castes, who in turn are ritual-
ly superior to Magars, Ghartis, Metalworkers, Leatherworkers, Tailors, 
and so on. The specific castes vary from place to place, but in every 
                                               
5 Michael Thompson, in an unpublished paper written for the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis of Laxenburg, Austria, suggests the 
applicability of Douglas’s types to Nepalese Hindus and Buddhists, though 
he puts her typology to very different use than do I. (He discusses their dif-
fering attitudes to risk [Thompson, 1983].) The application of Douglas’s 
work to the Coast Miwok is my own (Spickard, 1974). 
case different castes exhibit differing—and hierarchically graded—
behavior and styles of life. Deference to those of a higher caste is an 
enforced norm. 
These kin-centered people see conformity as a moral ideal. In 
Nepalese caste society, Haimendorf notes, the individual is not an in-
dependent agent but belongs to a tightly organized community, and 
must constantly act for that community’s welfare. For example, the 
Chetris, a high-caste group, preoccupy themselves with caste rules, 
striving always to avoid pollution and to maintain their ritual status. 
“Their ideal is the man who lives strictly according to the rules of his 
caste and never undertakes any action which endangers the purity of 
his status or arouses unfavorable comment among his caste-fellows.” 
(Haimendorf, 1979: 169.) 
This tight caste organization is paralleled in family life by a devel-
oped patriarchalism. Fathers retain authority even over their grown and 
married sons, and women are subject to the authority of men through-
out their lives, first fathers, then husbands. To dishonor one’s family is 
the chief sin; to honor it requires obedience in all things. 
Ritual pollution incurred by the living, for example, can even af-
fect the status of one’s departed ancestors. Were a man to marry a 
woman who had been previously betrothed, his kinsmen who have al-
ready reached heaven might have to leave it and descend to hell. 
(Haimendorf, 1979: 173.) One can scarcely imagine a greater stimulus 
to conformity. 
But this corporate concern stops at a group’s boundaries. Other 
than intercaste deference, it simply does not matter to Nepalese Hindus 
what the members of other families and other groups do. Hinduism, 
says Haimendorf, does not present a single moral law to which obedi-
ence is required of all persons, as do Western religions. 
Hindu society generally, says Haimendorf, is dominated by a no-
tion of ethical relativity. Action appropriate to one caste or group is 
inappropriate to another. Aside from responsibility for the behavior of 
one’s kin and caste-fellows, one is not concerned with the activities of 
others; one’s responsibility is focused on one’s own people. 
Likewise, Hinduism allows different groups to have different gods, 
goddesses, and godlings to whom they pay homage in various ways. 
Hitchcock (1966: chapter 3) details the numerous and changing deities 
of the Magars, a mid-level caste, and notes that many are specific to 
particular locations, particular lineages, and even particular house-
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holds. Religion is family-centered, and as people respond to the de-
mands of their own family and not others, so they respond to their own 
family’s gods. The spiritual world is fragmented much like the social. 
Gods, like people, possess a hierarchy, and their behavior may be in-
fluenced differently depending on their godly social position. 
Douglas’s theory roughly predicts this parallel between social and 
cosmo-logical structure, at least for hierarchically organized societies. 
And because the chief problem of this kind of society is how to let 
many different kinds of people live in relative peace together, a mutual 
tolerance in the moral sphere and a fragmentation of deities in the reli-
gious realm both make good organizational sense. Peace is maintained 
by recognizing that different people have different goals and must 
meet different (supernatural) demands. 
At the same time, the Nepalese agricultural situation requires a 
strong kin and lineage system. Nepalese cultivators exploit a limited 
amount of arable land, and need strict rules to prevent either the frag-
mentation of that land into unfarmable plots or its concentration into 
only a few hands. A strong family keeps land ownership stable, so that 
subsistence can be maintained. Pollution beliefs emphasize the group 
and draw tight boundaries between groups that might compete for sim-
ilar resources. Though caste hierarchy divides labor, it turns much of 
the potential competitiveness of these groups into reciprocal interde-
pendence. 
This interdependence becomes symbolized in the religious sphere. 
As Hitchcock (1966: 34) remarks, “the gustatory godlings are em-
blems of two ideas: the idea of reciprocity and the idea of scarcity. . . . 
[and] express the inevitable ambiguities of [the Magar] situation.” 
Supporting this analysis is the fact that taboos on intercaste contact are 
less developed in areas where there is less pressure on the land. There 
the necessity of group solidarity vis-à-vis outsiders is not so great (pp. 
41–42). 
In sum, for Nepalese Hindus religion and family go together, but 
not as our culture expects: within each caste and lineage we find great 
conformity, but great toleration of other groups’ gods and other ways 
of living. In this hierarchical society, religious notions parallel kin re-
lations. Social unity is maintained through diversity. 
Buddhist Sherpas 
The situation is quite different among Nepalese Buddhists, espe-
cially the Sherpas studied by Haimendorf and by Michael Thompson.6 
The sense of corporate kinship so central to Hindu society is generally 
lacking. A kin-system clearly exists, but individual families are rela-
tively independent of wider kin obligations. Haimendorf (1964: 39) 
argues that this is a consequence of the Sherpa economy: migratory 
herding rewards self-reliance and discourages stringent kinship obliga-
tions. 
Though Sherpas have loose clan affiliations, and there are some 
rudimentary caste-like distinctions, these by no means approach the 
hierarchism of the settled Hindu populations. Instead, they approxi-
mate the American discrimination against those “from the wrong side 
of the tracks.” Sherpas possess what Haimendorf calls an “open socie-
ty” in which individual initiative is more important than family posi-
tion. Group boundaries are generally low, and generations of 
immigrants have been able to make themselves a place. 
While every society must find itself a means of social control, 
Sherpa society has made that control less onerous than many: it is ba-
sically egalitarian, and whatever authority exists is vested in the totali-
ty of its inhabitants. This authority is delegated to elected officials 
whose privileges are strictly defined. Much activity falls outside of 
their scope and is unregulated. (Haimendorf, 1979: 182.) 
Unlike Hindu villages, Sherpa villages lack corporate councils for 
dispute resolution. Instead, every village has one or two men who are 
skilled in mediation. These men neither hold office nor possess any 
authority over others, but attempt to defuse conflict by meeting with 
the quarrelers—usually over beer—and seeking agreement. “The 
peace-maker gains social esteem and religious merit, but does not get 
any material reward for his efforts and the expenditure he has in-
curred” (Haimendorf, 1964: 182). 
Families, too are independent. As soon as a couple marries, it es-
tablishes its own household (to which, as is well known, a second hus-
band may later be added). The family’s economy is independent of 
others’, though there is some unorganized sharing for the benefit of the 
poor. Because of the altitude, the growing season is short, and a family 
must engage in other activities to make ends meet. Usually this in-
volves trading—either bringing goods up from the lowlands or bring-
                                               
6 Haimendorf (1964,1975,1979); Thompson (1982). Cf. Peissal (1979). 
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ing goods across the Himalayas from Tibet (though this latter oppor-
tunity is now closed). Lately it has involved work for mountaineers—
an occupation that requires the same self-reliance and ability to be 
gone from home for long periods that trading previously demanded. 
(Thompson, 1982.) Families must often make do with absent men—a 
factor which has probably contributed to the acceptability of polyan-
drous marriage among these people. 
Compared to Hindus, kin-group control over the individual is ex-
tremely low. While Hindu marriages are arranged and relations be-
tween the sexes are severely regulated, Sherpas decide their own 
marital fates and casual sex prior to marriage is the norm. And consid-
ering the fact that a girl’s amorous liaisons take place in the same 
room where her parents are sleeping, a blind eye and a deaf ear to oth-
ers’ behavior must be culturally valued. Parents are not authoritarian; 
in fact Haimendorf lists one of their chief sins as being “to threaten 
children or make them cry . . . whatever the reason” (1979: 187). 
But there are areas of life where collective activity is necessary, 
though extremely difficult for an individualist society to carry off. 
Mountain travel depends on a network of trails and bridges, which 
demand constant upkeep; yet there are no public organizations which 
make it their business to perform this work. Nuclear families are cer-
tainly not up to the task, and communal work cannot be compelled by 
any wider group. 
Here the Sherpas’ Buddhism has its effect. The Sherpas’ moral 
system is based on the belief that every act of virtue adds to an indi-
vidual’s store of merit, whereas every morally negative action or sin 
diminishes this valuable commodity. They place special emphasis on 
meritorious activities which benefit the general public and even com-
plete strangers. This demonstrates one’s total selflessness, for one’s 
efforts will not benefit one’s kin and friends more than others. Provid-
ing for the construction of bridges, the maintenance of trails and so on, 
as well as the sponsorship of religious and secular festivals, provide 
scores of good marks for anyone interested in improving their chances 
in the afterlife. Economic surplus is expended not only in the support 
of religious institutions (and the manufacturers of the famous prayer-
wheels), but also in the provision of secular good works. (Haimendorf, 
1979: 182ff.) After death a person’s good and bad deeds are counted 
up, and the balance of good or bad marks determine a man’s fate. 
Sherpas do not believe their deities punish them or demand sacri-
fices of them. They see serving the deities as a possible source of mer-
it, but not the only source available. Their concept of sin centers on 
infringements upon the dignity of persons or animals rather than on 
offenses to gods. Sins against persons will weigh most against them at 
the end of their lives—though to the extent that spirits are persons, 
they deserve good treatment too. The model of ideal action vis-à-vis 
others is extended to the gods rather than the other way around. Ethics 
lie at the center of religious life. 
Unlike Hindus, who spend a great deal of time trying to placate 
spirits, Sherpas’ notions of the highest powers in life are almost me-
chanical. Merit is a calculable substance, attainable through specified 
and commonly known channels. Sin—or demerit—is calculable as 
well, and is something that is almost unavoidable in the course of day-
to-day existence. So the goal of life is to accumulate enough merit 
(while avoiding enough demerit) to help one later on. 
Clearly, on Douglas’s terms, this cosmology is functional to the 
Sherpa social organization. The society is individualistic, probably as a 
response to a difficult ecological situation, and as a result is unable to 
carry out certain civic activities necessary for its survival. So, the reli-
gious orientation of the people—likewise individualistic—provides the 
means by which these activities can be carried out. Through religion 
the weaknesses of the social sphere are overcome. 
But this religion is not family-centered, and individuals are on their 
own vis-à-vis the supernatural world. Douglas’s schema predicts this 
individualism, because, in her view, cosmology reflects social life. 
Contrary to our own cultural stereotype, a weak family structure does 
not mean a weak religion—just a different one. 
Coast Miwok Sorcery 
Our third case, as promised, is more complex. The Coast Miwok 
Indians of central California were a settled village people exploiting a 
relatively rich environment.7 Their location just to the north of San 
Francisco Bay (prior to the Spanish conquest) gave them access to 
acorns, shellfish, waterfowl, roots, deer, rabbits, buckeyes, and other 
foodstuffs in relative abundance. They were organized into tightly 
                                               
7 See Spickard, 1987, for sources for and an extended discussion of the fol-
lowing. 
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bounded exogamous lineages which “owned” these resources, each 
family group (lineage and family being synonyms for these people) 
holding gathering rights to certain tracts for each of the major re-
sources. There were no interlineage work groups and no village-wide 
institutions for the redistribution of surplus. Most of the time they did 
not need any. Each extended family was self-sufficient, and, in gen-
eral, lived well in a relatively stable environment. 
Residents of rural California, however, know something about this 
purported “stability.” The mountains in which the Miwok lived are 
dominated by a series of micro-climates. Weather in this area varies 
considerably from year to year, and the variation from valley to valley 
and hillside to hillside is even greater. 
This variation had a particularly important impact on the acorn 
crop—the staple of the California Indian diet. While in a given year 
the oaks owned by one lineage might bear prolifically, those owned by 
another might prove barren. The same was true of buckeyes and 
seeds—the replacement staples. Hunting with the small bows available 
at the time was notoriously difficult, and this left shellfish as the sole 
more-or-less dependable resource. And if the members of a given line-
age became sick and unable to gather, their ability to feed themselves 
was in jeopardy. 
Of course, common sense suggests that if one family’s resources 
failed, that family should be able to get help from others. In south-
central California, for example, the village headman functioned as a 
center for redistribution—in other words, taxing the rich to give to the 
poor. But this was not the Miwok headman’s role. Though some redis-
tribution did occur, it was not so regularly institutionalized as else-
where. Instead, because the boundaries between lineages and those 
between villages were so great, cooperation across them was next to 
impossible. So, for those whose resources had failed, all that kept them 
going was their savings from the past and the fact that the next year the 
resources would succeed—while some other lineage would get the 
short end of the stick. 
To see what happened in this situation, we need only enter into the 
mental framework of the Miwok and see the universe from their point 
of view. The Miwoks knew nothing of science, had no conception of 
natural causality, and in particular could not explain why one oak 
grove would bear in a given year and another would not. It would have 
been one thing if all families’ resources had failed, but they did not. 
Only a few did so, and only a few were struck by disease, while others 
had plenty to eat and were healthy. Their reasoning was sensible: mys-
tical effects must come from mystical causes. Obviously, they thought, 
if one family is fat while another is starving, then a sorcerer must be at 
work. 
Sorcery fears were rife among the Miwok and their neighbors. 
Sorcerers never came from one’s own lineage (in pre-contact times), 
but from the lineages of one’s enemies. One had always to be on guard 
against them—much as today we are on guard against reckless drivers 
when we cross a busy street. If one were to let a bit of one’s hair, one’s 
nail parings, one’s feces, or the like fall into the hands of a sorcerer, 
then one would be in grave danger. These very substances—
boundaries of the body, symbolically speaking—could be used to pen-
etrate a person’s own bodily boundaries, and cause one to sicken and 
die. 
I do not want to detail Miwok sorcery beliefs, for they are not at is-
sue here.8 My point is that Miwok cosmology, as best I have been able 
to reconstruct it, involved a perception of mystical danger to members 
of families—both at the hands of other families and from usually neu-
tral (though sometimes maleficent) spirits. It is not quite correct to say 
that the Miwoks had a religious pantheon, for the only beings equiva-
lent to gods were active at the beginning of and the renewal of the 
world, and, furthermore, these gods did not take an interest in people’s 
day-to-day affairs. The entry of the supernatural into the human realm 
took place at the time of misfortune, and usually wore human robes. 
This cosmology was a product and a reflection of a particular kind 
of family structure—one in which kin groups did not cooperate with 
one another. On the one hand, the relatively rich environment made 
this lack of cooperation possible (had the environment been less rich 
the innate selfishness of the system could never have prevailed); on the 
other hand, that same environment’s occasional failures presented a 
practical problem that demanded solution. The cosmology that resulted 
both explained environmental failures and expressed the underlying 
social hostilities in a particularly direct way. 
Given all this tension, one might ask how such a society survived 
with any stability for over a thousand years. How were lineages—
                                               
8 The symbolism of these beliefs first interested me in Douglas’s theories 
(Spickard, 1974). 
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being exoga-mous—able to reproduce, given a generalized uncoopera-
tiveness periodically erupting into hostility? One answer is that the 
level of inter-lineage tension was not always high; though the envi-
ronment was not stable enough for sorcery fears ever to dissipate en-
tirely, resource-failure was not a yearly recurrence. In addition, by 
trading women (and men) repeatedly, specific lineages became infor-
mal marriage providers. Until a child was born to a couple, the in-
marrying partner was looked upon with some suspicion, but after the 
birth of one or two children, the spouse as well as his or her lineage 
was regarded as relatively safe. This tended to focus sorcery fears 
away from certain lineages and toward others, and provided a path for 
material assistance to flow in time of need. 
Just as important, however, was a third option: expulsion. Because 
certain lineages developed such bad reputations for sorcery over a long 
period of time, and were so cut off from their neighbors, the neighbors 
would expel them from the village. Although the records I consulted 
revealed that this was a rare occurrence, it was, nevertheless, possible, 
and therefore could defuse a particularly volatile situation. 
Like Nepalese Hindus and Sherpas, the Miwoks’ cosmology re-
flects their family structure. Trapped in tightly bounded lineages that 
lacked interfamily ties, they saw anything outside themselves as 
threatening. The typical response to such threat was to draw closer to 
those one could trust, exacerbating the family’s isolation. Society and 
cosmology reinforced one another, and were themselves reinforced by 
an environment that failed at random—lending credence to the per-
ceived supernatural menace. 
Unlike the Hindus and Sherpas, however, Miwok cosmology did 
not solve their social problems. Though one would expect social isola-
tion to be overcome by sharing, sorcery fears stood in the way. Fami-
ly-centeredness in this faction-ridden society did not promote 
tolerance, but aggression. Had their environment failed more frequent-
ly, it is doubtful that their society could have survived. 
North American Parallels 
 I have summarized the foregoing in Table 1 which lists the prima-
ry attributes of each of the three social types in Douglas’s model, 
along with the religious cosmologies that accompany them and some 
suggested examples. Her basic principles—that cosmology reflects 
social structure, and often proves functional to its continuance—
should be clear. 
Table 1. Cosmology and Family Structure 
  
Family Type 
 
 
Hierarchical Individual Factional/Sectarian 
Social at-
tributes 
Group-centered 
Internal ranks/many 
linked groups 
Fixed roles 
Inequality 
Person-centered 
networks 
Flexible roles 
Equality 
Group-centered 
High group bounda-
ries 
(Role rigidity var-
ies) 
Internal equality 
Chief social 
problem 
How to stay togeth-
er 
How to do common 
tasks 
keeping group unity 
Religious 
attributes 
Polytheism 
In-group conformi-
ty/out-group toler-
ance 
Group defines doc-
trine 
Rituals central 
Pluralism 
Tolerance 
Individual defines 
doctrine 
Ethics central 
In-group monothe-
ism 
Bigotry 
Group defines doc-
trine 
Group membership 
central 
Cosmology's 
structure 
Parallels society 
(hierarchical) 
Parallels society 
(individualist) 
Parallels society 
(emphasizes bound-
aries) 
Cosmology's 
function 
Helps accept group 
differences 
Aids division of la-
bor 
Frees individual 
Aids tolerance 
Aids public works 
Encourages charity 
Defines the group 
against others 
Examples 
Nepalese Hindus 
Establishment 
Nepalese Buddhists 
(Sherpas) 
"New-Age" reli-
gions 
Coast Miwok 
Fundamental-
ists/Sectarians 
Unfortunately, I cannot take up these examples here in any greater 
detail. Instead, without pushing things too far, I would like to point out 
some possible North American parallels—religious groups on which 
Douglas’s typology might just shed some light. 
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Douglas asks us to look for a set of social relations that may be 
correlated with a religious cosmology. Since ours is a complex society, 
we would expect to find all three of her social types present in it. 
Although we do not find hierarchies on the Hindu scale among us, 
some parts of our society are clearly more hierarchical than others. For 
example, the so-called “Eastern Establishment”—the wealthier, old-
line, New England-centered denominations—is perhaps the closest 
thing to hierarchism left in this nation. It is in this Establishment, I ex-
pect, that we can find the tolerant, family-centered religions that best 
approximate the Hindu model. (The term Boston Brahmin becomes 
culturally interesting here.) 
In this subculture there is considerable church-going as a family 
activity. But with this habit is an attitude that considers the actual con-
tent of religious devotion (within a certain range) less important than 
its mere existence. Religion is seen as a private, family matter, and ex-
cessive preoccupation with things spiritual is not well regarded. That 
is, some religiousness is expected from all, but it should not take over 
all of one’s life and certainly should not create barriers between peo-
ple. 
Though I did grow up with people like this, and have certainly met 
many of them in my adult life, I am not sure to what extent such a sub-
culture still exists in America. The shifts in political and social power 
in the last few decades (see Bensman and Vidich, 1971) lead me to 
believe that this group is certainly much less influential than it once 
was, and is not the wave of the future for American religion. But as a 
theorist rather than a church sociologist, I will leave it to others to 
check out my suppositions. 
I suspect the other two types will be of greater future importance. 
While the factionalism of the Miwok does not have a complete 
American parallel, on the so-called “Religious Right” there is both a 
clear concern for family issues, along with an intolerance for alterna-
tive points of view that clearly does not fit with either the Hindu or the 
Buddhist models. While I would not be as willing as Douglas to identi-
fy all religious sectarians with the factional social type,9 there is some 
truth to this association. Certainly if one looks at the proliferation of 
                                               
9 Comments to this effect may be found in Douglas (1970,1973a, 1982) and 
in unpublished remarks made before the 1983 convention of the American 
Academy of Religion in Dallas. 
fundamentalist groups over the last century or so of American history, 
the combination of religious and social conservatism with a desire for 
factional purity stands out (Marsden, 1980). 
The standard sociological description of the supporters of this reli-
gious right portrays them as being left out of the dominant cultural and 
economic developments of recent years.10 Urban sophistication, lax 
upper-middle-class morality, the lack of patriotism and traditional val-
ues perceived among the educated and the jet-set—all these are focal 
points for political resentment that wears a religious mask. Like the 
Miwok, the members of these classes, so the explanation goes, act out 
their social frustrations in a religious idiom, and a particularly intoler-
ant one. 
The key here is the moral distinction made between “them” and 
“us”—a division that is also found among certain of the “new reli-
gions” such as the Unification Church or the People’s Temple. On 
Douglas’s theory the high external barriers erected by these groups go 
hand in hand with a dualistic cosmology which serves to reinforce 
group identity—that is, to maintain the very barriers which make the 
group unique. Of course these barriers also isolate the group, encour-
aging social conflict—as in the Miwok case. 
Most important is a religious dualism paralleling the social. Unlike 
the Establishment, sectarians emphasize the cosmic struggle between 
Good and Evil. The key question, both religious and political, is 
“Whose side are you on?” Only one answer is allowed. “Family,” 
“traditional values,” and so on have become code words for in-group 
membership. The modern religious right seeks to recast all of society 
in its image. 
What is the future of this intolerant sectarianism? Secularization 
theory sees it as a response to modernity, and believes that as we be-
come used to our new way of life, fundamentalism will fade away. On 
Douglas’s model we would disagree. Her theory predicts that any time 
a society becomes factionalized such aggressive, dualist cosmologies 
will emerge. 
But not all of the new religious sectarians are rightist, or even 
Christians. Much of America’s new spirituality has affinities with the 
eastern religions, and “new-age” sects seemingly spring up every-
                                               
10 See Bensman and Vidich (1971: l48ff). For other views see Marsden 
(1983) and Anthony and Robbins (1983). 
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where. Even the mainline denominations have altered much of their 
ministry from traditional families to youth work, urban outreach, and 
so on. Ministry by women, “marriages” of homosexuals, Zen in the 
chancel—many of the trends that the religious right-wing abhors are 
an ever-expanding part of the American scene. 
Rather than moralize, Douglas’s theory would have us look to the 
social relations that support this change. I think we can find a parallel 
to the Sherpa case here. 
Economically speaking, the family is much less important to sur-
vival in America than it once was. With the decline of family-centered 
enterprises, including farming, the rise of salaried employment, and 
particularly the growth of national firms at the expense of local busi-
nesses (and the resulting necessity of job mobility), the maintenance of 
a family has become a luxury that some cannot afford. At the same 
time, cheap and effective means of birth control free those who want 
sex but not children from the necessity of having a spouse as well. 
Like the Sherpas, economic mobility and easy sexuality go hand in 
hand with both a restriction on the importance of kin ties, and with an 
individualization of religion. The relationship between a person and 
the spiritual world can now be a matter of the individual heart. 
Theologically, these individuals see God, life, or some other all-
encompassing end as something to be actively sought, not passively 
awaited. Thus the growth of various kinds of meditation, the populari-
ty of the ecstatic experience of the divine among both Catholics and 
Protestants, the resurgence of liberal Quakerism as a religion of expe-
riencing—all are indications of a cultural move toward individualism 
in religious life. 
But as in the Sherpa case, with the decline of the family, all is not 
sin and degradation. As Buddhism is for the Sherpas a religion of eth-
ics, and one which is functional to the wider social situation, so ethics 
are at the center of this new religious development. “Do your own 
thing” goes hand in hand with “do unto others . . .” Social philanthropy 
is alive and well, and the church’s outreach to those traditionally ex-
cluded from its life does much to alleviate the condition of the casual-
ties of modern living. 
Individualism in religion, and the centrality of both ethics and an 
active spiritual striving both seem to me to be correlated with a society 
in which, at least for major sectors of the population, extended and 
even nuclear families have become economically irrelevant, and even 
difficult to maintain. The decline of the group and the increasing au-
tonomy of the individual, while causing great psychological strains, 
place both the burden of the pursuit of social justice and the pursuit of 
God—key elements of our Judeo-Christian heritage—squarely on the 
individual’s shoulders. Thus, it is up to the individual—not the family 
or the church—to carry this burden. And if individual experience be-
comes the touchstone of spirituality, the proliferation of paths that 
these individuals take in their spiritual pursuits will probably continue. 
If the foregoing is valid and if current socioeconomic trends con-
tinue, Douglas’s theory predicts that American religion will become 
more individualized, more tolerant of disparate religious paths, and 
even more concerned with ethical action toward others.11  
I must admit, however, that I find it disturbing to be able to explain 
by sociological means the kind of spirituality toward which I am most 
drawn, and which I see as being the most appropriate path toward an 
appreciation of Deity. 
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